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This paper examines the differential effects of the unemployment rate at entry to the labor 
market, defined as completion of education, on subsequent wages across race and gender. 
Economic theories about search frictions, human capital accumulation and the internal 
labor markets all predict less persistence for low skilled or disadvantaged workers and weaker 
effects on those with weak attachment to the labor force. Consistent with these predictions, 
I find that the effect fades faster for blacks, although the initial impact of a recession at entry 
is stronger for them. I also find weaker effects for women. 
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| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
ecent studies have established that entering the labor market during a recession has 
long-term effects on the person’s subsequent wages and career path (Oreopoulos, 
von Wachter and Heisz 2006, Kahn 2006). However, how the long-term 
consequences of such exogenous shocks at entry vary across different demographic groups 
has not been explored. Since the effect of contemporaneous labor market conditions differs 
considerably across demographic groups, the long-term effect of a recession at entry into the 
labor market may well differ. Given that the existing studies have mainly targeted 
high-skilled workers with strong attachment to the labor force, namely white male college 
graduates, focusing on African Americans and women may uncover different patterns for 
workers who are relatively less-skilled and with weaker attachment to the labor force.  
This paper examines the effect of the unemployment rate at entry to the labor market, 
defined by completion of education, on subsequent wages by race and gender using data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. To control for nation-wide cohort effects, 
I exploit variations in unemployment rates across states, with controls for time invariant 
state characteristics and regional differences in black-white wage gaps. I also address the 
endogenous determination of time and place of entry conditional on the decision of college 
degree attainment using an instrumental variable and provide evidence that the correlation 
between attainment of a college degree and the unemployment rate at age 18 is negligible. 
I find a weaker effect of a recession at entry for women than for men; this contrast is 
especially stark for whites, for the effect for white women is almost zero. Also, although the 
initial impact is stronger for blacks than for whites, the effect fades faster for blacks, too. 
These findings are consistent with the predictions by economic theory: less persistence for 
low skilled workers and weaker effects on those with weak attachment to the labor force. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 contains a brief overview the 
previous literature. Section 3 reviews relevant theories and their predictions. Then, Section 
4 describes data and Section 5 describes empirical strategy. Estimated effects of a recession 
at entry are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
| 2 | BACKGROUND 
here is a good deal of evidence that entering labor market during a recession lowers 
subsequent wages for relatively high skilled men. Oreopoulos et al. (2006) have 
established these key observations using a large panel dataset of Canadian male 
college graduates to estimate the effect of graduating colleges during a recession. They find a 
significant negative effect on earnings that gradually fades away and a positive effect on 
turnover and mobility across industries and regions. My empirical specification follows their 
work. Kahn (2006) reports similar results using the sample of white male college graduates 
in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the same data source used in this paper, with 
a slightly different empirical specification. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, the long-term 
effect of a recession at entry for less educated men, African Americans or women in North 




On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for differential affects of the 
contemporaneous labor market conditions across different demographic groups. Although it 
is controversial whether an economic upturn benefits economically disadvantaged people as 
much as the more advantaged,1 there is little doubt that the costs of a downturn are borne 
disproportionately by the disadvantaged (Cutler and Katz 1991, Hines, Hoynes and 
Krueger 2001, Clark and Summers 1981). The stronger effect of the contemporaneous 
labor market condition suggests, on one hand, a stronger initial impact for the relatively 
disadvantaged group; on the other hand, the vulnerability to aggregate shocks after entry to 
the labor market may reduce the persistence of a negative shock at entry.  
Several earlier studies have explored the effects of a high unemployment rates in the 
beginning of job tenure on current wages (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom 1994b) and quitting rates (Bowlus 1995). Although the effects of 
unemployment rates in the beginning of job tenure are conceptually different from those of 
the unemployment rates at entry to the labor market, these studies provide several clues to 
disentangle the confounded effects. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) find that current wages 
depends on the minimum unemployment rates during the job tenure, rather than the 
unemployment rates at the beginning of the job, and regard it as evidence that worker can 
move to better jobs during booms. In contrast, Baker et al. (1994b) find a persistent effect 
of the labor market condition at entry to a large firm. Although, at first glance, the two 
results contradict to each other, both can be true if the only way for a worker to improve her 
situation is moving to a better employer, provided that the firm size serves as a measure of 
job quality. Bowlus (1995) finds that a job started during a recession ends earlier and 
interprets it as evidence of deterioration of matching quality. 
 
| 3 | RELEVANT THEORIES AND PREDICTIONS 
everal interrelated factors produce a persistent negative effect of a recession at entry on 
subsequent wages. First, search frictions prolong the process to resolve the initial bad 
matches. The logic is straightforward: it takes time and costs to find a good job under 
incomplete information about available job opportunities. In a typical job search model, a 
new job opportunity drawn from a given distribution arrives randomly and a worker 
chooses to take the job if she finds it is better than remaining in her present job. Since a 
worker voluntarily changes her job only if her wage increases, workers who obtained 
high-wage jobs at entry remain in the high-wage jobs while workers who had low-wage jobs 
have to move up gradually through job search. 
The advantage of obtaining a high-wage job at entry vanishes when the worker is dismissed 
or quits due to exogenous reasons such as marriage and childbirth. Therefore, the effect of 
entering the labor market during a recession will be more persistent for people who are 
                                                 
1While Cutler and Katz (1991) argue that the explanation in the mid-late 80s did not benefit the 
disadvantaged, Hines et al (2001) view the 1980s as an exception and conclude that the benefits from strong 
economic growth for the disadvantaged are at least as great as they are for the more advantaged using data 





more likely to stay in the labor force without being dismissed. Since unemployment rates 
for blacks are more variable in response to the business cycle conditions (Altonji and Blank 
1999), it is natural to think that blacks are more likely to be dismissed in a recession after 
entry. Studies on cyclical up-grading of the labor force (e.g. Okun 1973, Devereux 2004) 
also suggest that people who lose their jobs in recessions are less skilled while those who 
move up to higher paying jobs in booms are more skilled, that is, the story based on search 
theory is more relevant to more skilled workers. Likewise, a turnover due to marriage or 
childbirth will make the effect of recessions at entry less persistent for women than for men. 
Note that, in this sort of search model, the initial impact of a recession is stronger for 
groups more sensitive to temporary fluctuations of labor demand in the entry-level labor 
market. Therefore, the impact of a recession on wages in the first few years will be greater 
for blacks. On the other hand, the initial impact on women will be weaker because they are 
less sensitive to aggregate labor market conditions (Clark and Summers 1981, Altonji and 
Blank 1999). 
Further, missing opportunities for on-the-job training due to a bad match can aggravate the 
negative effect of entering the labor market during a recession.2 It is ambiguous whether the 
loss of training opportunities matters more to African Americans, who on average have 
lower education and other pre-market human capital,3 and fewer training opportunities on 
the job. If pre-market human capital increases returns to on-the-job training, missing a 
training opportunity will matter more to white workers; if the marginal return to training is 
diminishing, it will matter more to black workers. In any case, this loss of human capital 
would not occur if the worker could move to a job with better training opportunities 
without frictions; thus the amount of the lost training opportunity is likely to be greater for 
whites. Also, weak labor force attachment implies less incentive to invest in human capital, 
thus it predicts a weaker effect of a recession at entry on subsequent wages for women than 
for men. 
The discussion drawing on search frictions implicitly assumes the existence of long-term 
employment contracts. Going a little further, if wages are also determined in long-term 
contracts, the initial conditions of labor market directly affect the subsequent wages. 
Although the evidence from existing studies is mixed,4 at least for some workers wages are 
not very sensitive to the external labor market conditions. Moreover, access to internal labor 
markets of high-paying firms through the entry-level jobs may be limited to new graduates. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) report suggestive evidence for this: majority of the 
entrants to a large firm are young workers who enter the lowest level job (ports of entry) and 
many of them stay in this firm for many years and are promoted within this firm. Although 
                                                 
2The idea of viewing an early job as a training opportunity goes back to Rosen (1972). Welch (1979) draws on 
this idea to explain why cohort size affects earnings. 
3For example, Table 2 shows that African Americans are not only less educated but also their scores of an 
ability-test are lower. See Section 5.1 of Altonji and Blank (1999) for the literature on pre-market human 
capital. 
4In addition to Baker et al (1994b) and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), which are summarized in Introduction 
of this paper, Grant (2003) replicates and extends the Beaudry-DiNardo model to find that both the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate and minimum rates over job tenure affect wages, and Bertrand (2004) 




they find a non-negligible number of entrants to higher level jobs, contrary to exclusive 
"ports of entry" described by Doeringer and Piore (1971), these entrants seem to have 
accumulated working experience elsewhere, which comes back to the issue of loss of training 
opportunity. 
As pointed by Doeringer and Piore (1971), jobs that require higher skill and pay higher 
wages are more likely to be associated with internal labor markets because complicated tasks 
often need sophisticated incentive schemes. On the other hand, marginal workers with weak 
attachment to the labor force obtain jobs in the secondary sector, which works more like a 
spot market. Thus, long-term wage contracts and internal labor markets seem to be more 
relevant to more skilled workers with stronger labor force attachment. The higher share of 
white men in higher-paying occupations and industries (Altonji and Blank 1999) suggests 
that they are more relevant to white men. Grant (2003) also suggests that long-term wage 
contracts are actually slightly less relevant for women. 
To recapitulate, economic theory reviewed above predicts a stronger effect of a recession at 
entry for people with stronger labor force attachment, and the effect will be more persistent 
for more skilled workers who are more likely to be on stable employment contracts. 
Combining with the existing evidence of a stronger effect of contemporaneous labor market 
conditions for African Americans, the effect of a recession at entry is expected to be initially 
stronger but fade away faster for African Americans than for whites. Also, given that more 
women withdraw from the labor force upon marriage and child births than men, the effect 
is expected to be weaker for women. 
 
| 4 | DATA 
4.1 NSLSY79 
y main source of data is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY). 
The NLSY consists of a representative sample of the noninstitutionalized U.S. 
civilian segment of population aged 14-22 in 1979. In addition, a set of 
supplemental samples of Hispanics, blacks, and economically disadvantaged whites born in 
the same time period, and a military subsample are included. I drop the military subsample 
because it covers only cohorts born between 1957 and 1961, and the supplemental poor 
whites sample because they are dropped from the survey after 1991. I also drop Hispanics 
due to a fear of non-random selection by the sampling scheme (they had to be living in the 
US in 1979) and the small sample size. 
The year of labor market entry is defined as the last year of enrollment before the 
respondent turned 30 years old. I do not count enrollment for one or two years in colleges 
after not being enrolled at least for a year or enrollment after the age of 30 because it is 
likely to be a part of vocational trainings in community college or master’s courses for 
professional jobs.5 I drop observations that are missing information necessary to define the 
year and the state of entry; the detailed sample restrictions are described in the appendix. 
                                                 
5This definition follows Neumark (2002), who also used the NLSY to identify the effect of early job mobility 
on the adult wages. 
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Finally, 5387 individuals remain in the sample. Table 1 summarizes the number of 
individuals of each race-gender group and state unemployment rates by the year of labor 
market entry. About 90% of the sample entered the labor market during the twelve years 
between 1975 and 1986, the period including the recessions in 1975 and 1982-83. 
The variable for the years of schooling is “highest grade completed as of May 1,” and that 
for enrollment is “enrollment status as of May 1.” The highest degree/diploma attained, 
used to calculate the predicted year of entry as the instrumental variable for actual entry, is 
based on the following two questions “highest degree ever received” and “Does R have high 
school diploma or equivalent?” and not based on the highest grade completed. 
The real wages are deflated by the consumer price index. The hourly wages in the NLSY are 
defined as “hourly rates of pay at current or most recent job,” which is missing if the 
respondents did not work at all since last interview. At the same time, a small fraction of 
respondents are currently employed but lacking wages for some unknown reason. Table 2 
shows the number of observations with valid (positive) hourly wages, missing wages due to 
non-employment and missing wages for other reasons, for each race-gender-potential 
experience cell. The proportion with missing wages due to non-employment varies across 
race and gender: African Americans and women are less likely to have valid wages. Moreover, 
white women’s labor supply patterns over potential experience are opposite that of black 
women. 
Since the expected effect of the unemployment rate at entry on subsequent wages is negative, 
there might be a negative effect on subsequent employment as well. If the likelihood of 
having a valid wage were affected by the unemployment rate at entry, it would yields a 
sample selection bias. Thus, I also examine the effects on employment and the likelihood of 
having a valid wages in Section 5. In brief, the unemployment rate at entry does not have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of having a valid wage. On the 
contrary, the unemployment rate at entry has a weak, positive effect on employment, 
although the effect on the likelihood of having wages seems negligible. 
The state unemployment rates based on the CPS are available only for 1976-2000. However, 
dropping individuals who entered the labor market before 1975 may unbalance the 
composition of birth-year cohorts by making older cohorts more educated on average. Thus, 
I used the state unemployment rates based on the Unemployment Insurance records for 
1973-1975. Since the UI series tend to be lower than the CPS series, I rescaled it, 
multiplying by the coefficient of the CPS series in a regression of the UI series between 
1976 and 1982 on the CPS series of the same year and constant. 
4.2 Initial Evidence 
Figure 1 plots the average log real hourly wages over potential experience (years since entry) 
for the four demographic groups: white men, black men, white women and black women. 
To see how the observed average wage profiles differ across those who entered during booms 
and recessions, the sample are split into two groups, one with higher and one with lower 
unemployment rates at entry. First, the upper left panel shows a gradually fading but 
significantly persistent wage gap for white men, as expected; this is also consistent with 
existing results by Oreopoulos et al. (2006) and by Kahn (2006). For black men, the lower 
left panel shows a significant wage gap in the first few years, but it disappears sooner than 
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the gap among white men. This difference in persistence across race seems to fit in with the 
prediction by theory reviewed in Section 2. 
Turning to women, the upper right panel shows a very small gap among white women. The 
smaller gaps for women than men are consistent with the theories which predict a weak 
effect on those with weak labor force attachment. Surprisingly, black women who left 
school during recessions earn more in their fifth year or later. This counter-intuitive positive 
effect may be a spurious one due to accidental positive selection on educational background, 
which is shown in Table 3, or a state specific component that happened to correlate with 
the unemployment rates. Except for this, the observed patterns in Figure 1 agree with the 
predictions of theory. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics of educational background and the AFQT scores by race, 
gender and whether unemployment rate at entry was higher than the median of the sample. 
The highest grades completed are almost equal among those who entered the labor market 
during recessions and booms, except that black women who entered during recessions have 
slightly more education than black women who entered during booms. The AFQT score is 
the percentile score of Armed Forces Qualification Test, which was attached to the NLSY in 
1981. The AFQT score is often used as a measure of ability in studies using NLSY. Again, 
black women in the group with high unemployment rates at entry are slightly positively 
selected. Except for this, there is little difference within each race and gender group. At least, 
people who left during recessions are not negatively selected on education or pre-market 
human capital measured by the AFQT. 
Table 3 also shows that black people are more likely to have graduated when the 
unemployment rate was low. This difference mainly comes from the difference in race 
compositions across states, suggesting that it is essential to control for the entry-state fixed 
effects. Also, timing and place of entry may be endogenous because people may try to avoid 
entering the labor market during recessions. The next section describes strategies to deal 
with these issues. 
 
| 5 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
y goal is to identify the effect of the unemployment rate at labor market entry on 
subsequent wages for each gender and race group. To see the differences in 
persistence, I also allow the effect of the unemployment rate at entry to vary with 
potential experience (years since graduation from school). 
Since the state unemployment rate may correlate with unobserved characteristics of each 
state, controlling for the entry-state fixed effects is essential. This is especially crucial for the 
comparison of blacks and whites, given the considerably different racial composition across 
states. Also, since less educated people graduated earlier than more educated people in the 
same birth-year cohort, temporary macro shocks in the year of entry may also bias the 
estimates. It is important to keep in mind when using the NLSY that the majority of the 
sample who graduated from school during the recession in 1982-1983 are college graduates 
who have graduated from high school in the late 1970s. To control for these fixed effects, I 
include dummy variables for the state of entry and for the year of entry. The identification 
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of the effect of high unemployment at entry relies on the variations in unemployment rates 
at the year- and state- level net of those fixed components. Given the strong auto-correlation 
of unemployment rates, I also need to control for current business cycles so that the 
estimated coefficients do not pick up cyclical ups and downs. 
Specifically, consider the following wage function:  
itysystitstytysytyssit Xuuw εμηφδγβ ++++′++= −− ~)()(~log   (1) 
where yssitw ~  is the real hourly wage of individual  i   who left school in year  y   and in state  
s   observed in calendar year t  and state s~ , ysu is the unemployment rate of the year and 
the state of entry into the labor market, stu ~  is the current unemployment rate in the state of 
current residence, and itX  is other control variables including potential experience, the 
highest grade completed and the age adjusted AFQT score. Unobserved error components 
are decomposed into a calendar year fixed effect tφ , an entry-state fixed effect sη , an 
entry-year fixed effect yμ  and the remaining error itysε . 
If the sample size were large enough, (1) could be estimated separately for each gender and 
race. However, as shown in Table A2, some states have too few black people to include 
entry-state dummies in the blacks-only regressions. Therefore, I employ a parsimonious 
specification that pools black and whites together. Yet, I run separate regressions for men 
and women. It is necessary to take into account differences in the wage-experience profiles 
and sensitivity to aggregate labor market conditions across race groups, since 
misspecifications of them will contaminate the estimate of β . For example, steeper 
experience-wage profiles for men leads to an upward bias on the β  of older men. Also, the 
effect of the contemporaneous unemployment rate may well differ across demographic 
groups and potential experience. Therefore, I allow potential experience to enter 
non-parametrically as gyt ),( −α  and let the coefficients of unemployment rate at entry and at 
present vary across race and with potential experience. Furthermore, to incorporate the 
difference in racial wage gaps across regions, I include dummy variables for the ten BEA 
regions interacted with a dummy variable for blacks, rgθ . On the other hand, δ , tφ , sη  
and yμ  are left common to both white and black men:  
itysgyrgstitstgytysgytgytysgsit Xuuw εμθηφδγβα +++++′+++= −−− ~),(),(),(~log   (2) 
itX  here includes a dummy variable for blacks, years of schooling and the age adjusted 
AFQT score. (2) is estimated for women in the same manner. 
A potential source of bias that is still remaining is endogeneity of labor market entry. That is, 
some people may determine their timing and place of entry so that they can avoid entry 
during recessions. In theory, a high unemployment rate may increase enrolment to schools 
for two reasons: the relatively low opportunity cost of not working and avoidance of 
entering the thin labor market. Concerned mainly with the first aspect, Card and Lemieux 
(2000) have shown that a temporary rise of the local unemployment rate increases high 
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school enrollment for age 15-17, although the effect on college enrollment is weak, 
indecisive for men and slightly negative for women, using the Current Population Survey. A 
similar concern applies to the geographical mobility. Using the Census data, Wozniak 
(2006) reports that college graduates tend to move to states with high labor demand when 
they enter the labor market, although less educated people do not move as often. 
To see if the unemployment rate at entry or age 18 affects the year and the state of entry, I 
estimate several regressions over persons (not multiple observations per person) in the 
following form: 
iiigi FEsXuDept εδβ ++′+=var.      (3) 
The first column of Table 4 indicates the dependent variables and the second column 
indicates what iu  stands for: the unemployment rate at actual entry, at age 18 or at 
predicted entry. The predicted year of graduation is calculated as follows: year of birth + 18 
for those without any degree/diploma and those with high school diploma or equivalent, 
year of birth +20 for those with AA and year of birth + 22 for those with BA, BS, master 
and doctor. I use the state of residence at age 14 for the state of residence at age 18 and at 
predicted entry. iX  includes the race dummy and the age adjusted AFQT score, and FEs  
are the set of fixed effects appropriate for the corresponding iu  (see the notes below Table 
4). The dependent variables in rows (2)-(4) are discrete choice indices, and the estimates 
reported in Table 4 are from the linear probability model for the sake of intuitive grasp. The 
results from probit model are similar in terms of both statistical significance and marginal 
effects measured at the mean of the explanatory variables. 
Row (1) suggests weak positive effects of the unemployment rates on years of schooling, 
which is consistent with the findings by Card and Lemieux who use a larger dataset, 
although the effect of the unemployment rates at age 18 is not statistically significant. The 
effect on the likelihood of having a college degree (row (2)) is not statistically significant, 
either, and seems to be economically small as well. Furthermore, rows (3) and (4) show no 
evidence that people avoid graduating during a recession. 
Overall, the correlation between labor market conditions and options upon graduation is 
very weak for this sample from the NLSY. Yet, this may be due to the small sample size. If 
the tendency to adjust the timing and the place of entry were correlated with earning ability, 
it could still cause bias. Therefore, it is worth trying to correct for this endogeneity of entry 
by instrumenting for ysu  with the unemployment rate in the predicted year of graduation 
based on the highest degree attained (in the same manner as in Table 4) and the state of 
residence at age 14. 
Since the state of residence at age 14 is obviously exogenous in this context, the question is 
whether the predicted year of entry is exogenous. Admittedly, the decision to attain a degree 
is a choice and those who proceed to college during a recession might be different from 
those who proceed to college during a boom. However, from a practical view point, using 
the unemployment rate at particular age would be difficult. First, the unemployment rates 
at age 18 and younger do not have strong enough predictive power strong enough to work 
as an instrument for college graduates. Second, unemployment rates at older ages are 
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unlikely to be independent of the error term, since the business cycle conditions in the first 
few years after entry may affect subsequent wages for high school graduates. Further, as 
shown in Table 4, the probability of having a college degree does not seem to depend on the 
unemployment rate at age 18. Card and Lemieux (2000) also report that effects of the 
unemployment rate on the likelihood of proceeding to college for students in the twelfth 
grade are statistically insignificant and variable in sign. Also, recall that information on 
college degree is not based on the years of schooling but is directly asked. Thus, there is 
evidence that the decision to obtain a college degree is not correlated with the labor market 
conditions. 
On the other hand, I assign the year of birth + 18 to high school drop-outs because Card 
and Lemieux (2000) find positive effects of the unemployment rate on high school 
completion; likewise I ignore graduate degrees because Kahn (2006) reports that a recession 
at graduation from college slightly increases the likelihood of attaining a graduate degree. 
Since the number of high school drop outs and the number of those with graduate degrees 
are small, the instrument has sufficient explanatory power in the first stage regressions. The 
details of the first stage regressions are presented in the appendix; in brief, the coefficients of 
the instrument are around 0.5 and always statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
| 6 | RESULTS 
he first two columns of Table 5 reports  gyt ),( −β   in equation (2), the coefficients 
of the unemployment rate at entry interacted with race and potential experience, 
estimated by separate OLS regressions for men and women. Not surprisingly, 
there are negative effects right after entry for all demographic groups. However, 
the negative effect disappears in 6 years for black men, while the effect remains negative 
(though statistically insignificant) for white men. Also, for whites, the size of the effect is 
smaller for women; in fact, the effect is not statistically significant for white women even 
right after entry. Except that the effect for black women is stronger than that for black men, 
these observations are basically the same as what Figure 1 suggested. 
The last two columns of Table 4 report the estimates by IV in the same way as the OLS 
results. Here, the unemployment rate in the state and the year of actual entry is 
instrumented by the unemployment rate that the person would have experienced if she had 
stayed in the same state since she was fourteen years old and gone straight to her final degree 
attained. This instrumental variable should correct biases from endogenous choice of timing 
and place of graduation conditional on the highest degree attained. Note that instrumental 
variable estimators in general have larger standard errors than the corresponding OLS 
estimators; in fact the standard errors in the last two columns in Table 5 are much larger 
than those in the first two columns. The endogeneity of entry seems to bias the OLS 
estimates towards zero for men, although the standard errors are also boosted. 
Table 4 also reports the coefficients of years of schooling and the age adjusted AFQT score 
for comparison reason. The coefficients of the contemporaneous unemployment rate are 
not statistically significant, except that those for black men are significantly negative. This 
confirms that black men are the most affected group by the contemporaneous labor market 
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conditions. Each set of fixed effects is jointly statistically significant. 
To grasp the result more intuitively, Figure 2a and 2b plot the coefficients of the 
unemployment rate at entry over years since leaving school for each race gender group. 
Figure 2a compares the OLS estimates of  )( ytg −β   and Figure 2b compares the IV estimates 
of  )( ytg −β  . The gaps between men and women are larger in Figure 2b as the graphs for 
men shift downward while those for women shift slightly upward from Figure 2a. Yet, the 
same pattern across race hold for both OLS and IV estimates. These figures confirm the 
basic observations: the negative effect of high unemployment at entry is stronger for men 
than for women, and the slope is steeper (i.e. the effect fades faster) for blacks than for 
whites. 
If the unemployment rate at entry has a negative effect on wages, it may well have a negative 
effect on employment. Therefore, I estimate the effect on employment by replacing the 
dependent variable in equation (2). Table 6 reports the results from the linear probability 
model.6 Surprisingly, the estimated coefficients are mostly positive, although statistically 
insignificant. If those who were not employed were negatively selected on their potential 
wages, this positive effect would cause upward bias on the estimated effect. However, it is 
not very plausible that those with low potential wages are more likely to be employed when 
there is a negative shock to wages at the cohort level. Furthermore, the estimates tend to be 
larger for women, suggesting that decisions on marriages and fertility may matter. Thus, the 
direction of potential biases is ambiguous. 
In any case, recall that non-employment does not necessarily imply missing wages because 
respondents who have worked since last interview report wages even if they are not 
employed in the week of survey. Thus, to examine this issue more directly, table 7 reports 
the effect on the likelihood of having a valid wage. The estimated coefficients are still 
positive but on average smaller and noisier. Also, except for the IV estimates of black 
women, the estimated effects are economically small compared to the effects of years of 
schooling and the AFQT score. Further, I tried replacing the missing wage data with 
imputed wages based on several slightly different versions of wage equations with individual 
fixed effects, and found little differences in the estimated coefficients in the wage regressions. 
Therefore, I believe that, even if there are biases from non-random selection of those lacking 
valid wages, they will not alter the qualitative conclusions. 
 
| 7 | CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 have found the following facts. First, the initial impact of a recession at entry is stronger 
for African Americans than for whites, but the effect fades faster. Second, the negative 
effect is weaker for women than for men. Also, endogeneity of entry seems to cause 
underestimation of the effect for men. These findings are consistent with the economic 
theory reviewed in Section 2: the effect of a recession at entry will be stronger for people 
with stronger labor force attachment and more persistent for more skilled workers who are 
                                                 
6The probit estimates are similar to the corresponding OLS estimates in Tables 6 and 7, in both statistical 
significance and marginal effects evaluated at the mean of explanatory variables. 
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more likely to be on stable employment contracts. 
To put it the other way around, the benefit from a tight labor market at entry lasts only for 
white men, who are more likely to be employed in a stable job with good training 
opportunities. Although the lower persistence of the effect of a recession for blacks might 
sound like an advantage, actually it implies that they are more vulnerable to fluctuations in 
labor demand later in their career. Likewise, the weaker effect for women suggests that 
women cannot exploit the benefit from obtaining a good job at an early stage as much as 
men, presumably because of intermittence for marriage and childbirths. 
The observed difference between across races raises a further question. If the difference in 
the effect of a recession at entry is attributed to differences in skill, a comparison between 
less and more educated whites will be similar to a comparison between blacks and whites. 
Although it is hard to implement with the NLSY given its sample size, in another project I 
have confirmed the same pattern between less educated and more educated whites using the 
Current Population Survey (Kondo, Genda and Ohta 2007). Therefore, differences in skill 
are important factor of differential effects of graduating during a recession across races, 
although the possibility remains that racial discrimination plays an important role as well. 
It is difficult to distinguish one theory from the others. Note that skill level matters for both 
access to stable employment in high-paying jobs and returns to training. In theory, once a 
worker finds a good job after entry, a recession prior to the job change no longer matters in 
absence of human capital accumulation through the past on-the-job training. Therefore, 
controlling for labor demand at the beginning of the current job will cancel out the effect of 
a recession at entry if the loss of training opportunity does not matter. However, it is very 
difficult to simultaneously include unemployment rates in the year of leaving school and in 
the year of beginning of the current job, because they are highly collinear. Since this 
colinearity amplifies bias caused by misspecification of the effect of tenure and experience, it 
is necessary to include many interaction terms in the regression. The required sample size is 




A: Sample Restrictions and the Definition of Entry 
On the course of defining year of entry, I drop people who dropped out from the survey 
before turning to 30 years old. Then, I drop people with less than 6 years of schooling. The 
year of entry cannot be defined for people who are still in school at age 30, and those who 
never go to school since 1979 and miss the year of last enrollment before 1979. To merge 
with state unemployment rate, people have to live in the contiguous United States in the 
year of entry. I used state of residence at age 14 as the state of residence at entry for those 
entered before 1979. I also delete people who left school before getting 16 years old and 
those who have ever served in the army sometime within 12 years since leaving school. 
Lastly, I delete people whose state of residence at entry is too small to control state fixed 
effects. The number of people deleted and remaining is summarized in Table A1, and the 
number of individuals and the average unemployment rate by the state of entry is shown in 
Table A2. 
 
B. First Stages 
Table B1 is cross tabulation of age of actual and predicted entry. Many people actually enter 
the labor market several years after their predicted entry based on the highest degree ever 
received. This is partly because some people leave colleges without receiving degrees: about 
24% of those with only high school diploma report one or more years in college in answer 
to the question on the highest grade completed. Also, about 20% of those assigned 22 as the 
age of predicted entry have graduate degrees. Other people simply did not go straight to 
their final degree. Even among those who completed exact the twelfth grade, about 10% 
have not finished schooling by the age of 20. 
For the state, the proportion of people who had moved across states since the age of 14 
when they entered the labor market in each race-gender group is 13.6 % for white men, 
9.6% of black men, 14.5% of white women and 11.6% of black women. 
To see the correlation between the unemployment rates at actual entry and at predicted 
entry defined in Section 4, I estimate the following collapsed regression:  
iyrgsisygys Xuu εμθηδβ ++++′+= ~~~~     (5) 
where y~  is the year of predicted entry and s~  is the state of residence at age 14. Equation 
(5) is estimated separately for men and women. gβ  varies across race. iX  includes the race 
dummy, the age adjusted AFQT score and years of schooling.  ,~sη  ,rgθ  y~μ  are the fixed 
effects corresponding to the subscripts. The dataset consists of persons, not multiple 
observations per person. The upper panel of Table B2 reports estimated gβ : they are in the 
range of 0.37-0.51, and t-statistics are about 10. The correlation between the endogenous 
variable and the instrument is strong enough for all four race-gender groups. 
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The lower panel of Table B2 reports the coefficient of the instrument in the actual first 
stage regressions common to the IV estimates reported in Tables 5-7. Since the 
unemployment rate at entry is interacted with the four race-gender groups and the four 
3-year potential experience brackets, there are sixteen pairs of endogenous variables and 
corresponding instruments. Therefore, there are sixteen separate first stage regressions. 
Table B2 reports only the coefficient of the instrument corresponding to the endogenous 
variable in each regression. For example, the upper right cell means that a unit increase of 
the instrument is associated to increase of the unemployment rate at actual entry by 0.454 
for white men with 1-3 years of potential experience. The differences over potential 
experience are probably due to change in the composition of the sample caused by entry 
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Table 1: Number of Individuals and Mean Unemployment Rate by Year of Entry 
Year of entry U. rates White men White women Black men Black women Total 
1973 4.88 3 5 3 1 12 
1974 5.97 12 16 9 10 47 
1975 10.90 57 79 35 41 212 
1976 7.39 86 116 46 48 296 
1977 6.84 103 138 62 62 365 
1978 6.03 116 133 76 101 426 
1979 5.81 155 202 94 117 568 
1980 7.41 151 183 103 121 558 
1981 7.89 174 185 87 125 571 
1982 10.26 155 182 94 132 563 
1983 10.12 124 126 61 83 394 
1984 7.61 97 110 56 66 329 
1985 7.34 92 95 34 49 270 
1986 7.15 81 98 28 34 241 
1987 6.43 55 65 16 34 170 
1988 5.67 34 41 9 17 101 
1989 5.27 31 25 9 15 80 
1990 5.96 16 23 8 14 61 
1991 6.83 15 17 3 9 44 
1992 7.61 9 8 4 6 27 
1993 6.66 3 7 3 0 13 





Table 2: Number of Observations with and without Valid Wages (% of Total Number of 
Observations in the Corresponding Race-Sex-Potential Experience Category)  
 Exp. White men Black men White women Black women 
With valid wages 1-3 3,715 1,666 3,962 1,853 
  (88.7%) (75.4%) (81.6%) (63.3%) 
 4-6 4,248 2,101 4,418 2,220 
  (93.2%) (85.4%) (81.8%) (70.0%) 
 7-9 4,110 2,066 4,147 2,288 
  (94.7%) (86.2%) (80.6%) (74.8%) 
 10-12 3,603 1,824 3,588 2,054 
  (94.5%) (84.8%) (78.0%) (74.7%) 
Missing wages due to 1-3 330 466 744 1,002 
non-employment  (7.9%) (21.1%) (15.3%) (34.2%) 
 4-6 171 293 820 885 
  (3.8%) (11.9%) (15.2%) (27.9%) 
 7-9 97 258 854 716 
  (2.2%) (10.8%) (16.6%) (23.4%) 
 10-12 81 255 872 629 
  (2.1%) (11.9%) (19.0%) (22.9%) 
Missing wages though 1-3 145 78 151 71 
being employed  (3.5%) (3.5%) (3.1%) (2.4%) 
 4-6 140 65 161 65 
  (3.1%) (2.6%) (3.0%) (2.1%) 
 7-9 131 74 145 55 
  (3.0%) (3.1%) (2.8%) (1.8%) 
 10-12 130 72 140 68 
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Figure 1: Average wage profiles (no control for state/year)
 
 
Table 3: Mean of Selected Predetermined Variables by Unemployment Rate at Entry   
    White men Black men White women Black women 
U<=7.2 13.4 12.4 13.4 12.7 Highest grades 
completed U>7.2 13.4 12.3 13.4 13.0 
U<=7.2 0.25 -0.93 0.16 -0.93 Age adjusted 
AFQT score U>7.2 0.27 -0.95 0.19 -0.82 
U<=7.2 778 442 938 593 
# individuals 
U>7.2 791 398 916 492 
 
Note: 7.2% is the median of the unemployment rates at entry into the labor market among the 
entire sample (based on number of individuals).
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Table 4: Correlation with Unemployment Rates at Entry or Age 18 and Options Upon 
Graduation   
Dependent var. U at White men Black men White women Black women 
0.024 -0.009 0.059 0.062 Actual 
entry [0.027] [0.033] [0.026]** [0.030]** 
0.047 0.027 -0.006 0.008 
(1) Years of schooling 
Age 18 
[0.045] [0.047] [0.039] [0.040] 
(2) Having a college 










0.011 0.009 0.013 0.021 (3) Actual entry is later 
than predicted entry 
Predicted 
entry [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
-0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 (4) Having changed state 
of residence  
Actual 
entry [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] 
Note: OLS regressions (the linear probability model for rows (2)-(4)). The regressions on the 
unemployment rate at actual entry include dummies for year of entry and state of residence at entry. 
The regressions on the unemployment rate at age 18 include dummies for year of birth and state of 
residence at age 14. The regression on the unemployment rate at predicted entry includes dummies 
for year of predicted entry and state of residence at age 14. Standard errors are in brackets, clustered 
by the relevant pair of the year and the state. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant in 1%, 5% 
and 10%.  
 
 20
Table 5: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry on Wages 
 
 OLS IV 
 Men Women Men Women 
U at entry      
 White 



































































































Observations 22947 24233 22333 23404 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log real hourly wages (cents). Constant, current unemployment 
rates interacted with race and the three-year experience brackets, a race dummy, non-linear controls 
for potential experience differentiated by race are also included in the regressions though omitted 
from the table. OLS regressions include dummies for year of entry, state of residence at entry and 
year of the survey; IV regressions include dummies for year of predicted entry, state of residence at 
age 14 and year of the survey. Standard errors are in brackets, clustered by the year and the state of 
entry (predicted entry for IV). ***, **, * indicate statistically significant in 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Figure 2a: Coeffcients of U at entry; OLS
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Figure 2b: Coeffcients of U at entry; IV
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Table 6: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry on Employment  
 OLS IV 
 Men Women Men Women 
U at entry      
 White 



































































































Observations 25688 31460 24992 30430 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Notes: The dependent variable takes 1 if the respondent is employed. Linear probability model with 
the same right hand side variables as the OLS regressions in Table 5; see notes for Table 5. 
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Table 7: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate at Entry on Likelihood of Having a Valid 
Wage 
 OLS IV 
 Men Women Men Women 
U at entry      
 White 



































































































Observations 25,688 31,460 24,992 30,430 
R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 
Notes: The dependent variable takes 1 if the observation has a valid (positive) wage. Linear 
probability model with the same right hand side variables as the OLS regressions in Table 5; see 







Table A1: Sample Restrictions and Sample Size (Number of Individuals)  
 Deleted Remaining
Original NLSY 79 sample  12,686
Keep cross sectional white and black and supplemental black samples 
only; delete Hispanics, poor white and military sample 4,847 7,839
Dropped out from the survey before age 30  1,837 6,002
Highest grade completed at age 30 < 6 6 5,996
Enrolled at age 30 (except for two year college) 125 5,871
Not enrolled in 79 and missing last enrollment 46 5,825
State of residence at entry is missing 90 5,735
Age at entry <16 50 5,685
Served in the army sometime within 12 years since leaving school 293 5,392
State of residence at entry was too small (w/ <20 people in sample) 44 5,348
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Table A2: Sample Size by State of Residence at Entry (Number of Individuals)  
State Mean U Total Black men Black women White men White women 
Alabama 8.97 234 52 70 60 52 
Alaska 9.53 22 0 0 10 12 
Arizona 6.75 46 4 2 20 20 
Arkansas 7.91 80 20 37 9 14 
California 7.60 359 48 56 113 142 
Colorado 6.15 87 0 0 41 46 
Connecticut 5.80 106 8 8 36 54 
DC 8.08 48 23 22 2 1 
Florida 7.16 201 21 51 53 76 
Georgia 6.78 255 106 104 21 24 
Illinois 8.11 190 30 36 67 57 
Indiana 8.05 96 11 5 42 38 
Iowa 6.39 55 0 0 27 28 
Kansas 4.55 40 4 5 17 14 
Louisiana 8.85 57 14 24 7 12 
Maryland 6.10 61 6 14 17 24 
Massachusetts 6.31 78 10 7 24 37 
Michigan 11.04 357 32 42 134 149 
Minnesota 5.94 129 0 1 72 56 
Mississippi 9.36 54 18 32 2 2 
Missouri 6.79 145 34 35 30 46 
Montana 6.97 49 0 2 19 28 
New jersey 7.56 200 24 34 65 77 
New York 7.71 296 63 64 91 78 
North Carolina 6.57 241 51 61 57 72 
Ohio 8.53 379 42 68 126 143 
Oklahoma 5.82 56 16 16 13 11 
Oregon 8.36 28 0 1 10 17 
Pennsylvania 8.48 258 27 36 82 113 
South Carolina 7.23 193 59 83 14 37 
Tennessee 8.19 94 7 15 33 39 
Texas 6.17 287 59 84 56 88 
Virginia 5.54 162 36 41 42 43 
Washington 8.55 56 0 4 23 29 
West Virginia 9.98 122 4 11 42 65 
Wisconsin 6.75 227 11 14 92 110 
Note: States with less than 20 people (deleted): Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.  
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Table B1: Age of Predicted Entry and Actual Entry 
 White men White women 
 Age of predicted entry Age of predicted entry 
Age of actual entry 18 20 22 18 20 22 
16 54 0 0 68 0 0 
17 61 1 0 99 0 0 
18 368 7 1 474 9 3 
19 244 6 2 211 16 4 
20 82 17 3 97 26 11 
21 45 15 13 36 24 19 
22 31 9 125 33 14 189 
23 29 11 105 27 21 83 
24 18 9 57 25 12 46 
25-30 63 20 129 88 35 114 
Total 995 95 435 1,158 157 469 
 Black men Black women 
 Age of predicted entry Age of predicted entry 
Age of actual entry 18 20 22 18 20 22 
16 28 0 0 31 0 0 
17 67 0 0 58 1 0 
18 172 4 1 241 2 0 
19 188 3 0 176 6 0 
20 96 5 2 88 16 4 
21 39 7 2 80 16 13 
22 28 7 22 46 12 36 
23 13 5 24 29 9 30 
24 15 2 17 21 5 12 
25-30 33 7 28 64 21 39 
Total 679 40 96 834 88 134 
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Table B2: Coefficients of Instruments in the First Stage Regressions 
 White men Black men White women Black women 
Collapsed regressions 0.503 0.455 0.508 0.378 
 [0.042]*** [0.054]*** [0.043]*** [0.047]*** 
Actual first stage (16 separate regressions)    
 Potential Exp = 1-3 0.454 0.441 0.455 0.316 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
 Potential Exp = 4-6 0.574 0.523 0.589 0.404 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
 Potential Exp = 7-9 0.562 0.508 0.588 0.428 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
 Potential Exp = 10-12 0.557 0.534 0.589 0.454 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Note: See Appendix B for the detail. Standard errors are in brackets, clustered by the year of 
predicted entry and the state of residence at age 14. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant in 1%, 
5% and 10%.  
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